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There’s Still a Chance: Why the Clean Air Act Does Not Preempt State Common Law Despite
the Fourth Circuit’s Ruling in North Carolina v. TVA.
Thomas J. Alves

Many legal hurdles confront plaintiffs who assert common law public nuisance claims
against energy companies in an effort to curtail their production of greenhouse gases (GHG’s).
These include standing, political question, the dormant commerce clause, and federal
preemption. This paper explores federal preemption of common law public nuisance claims by
the Clean Air Act (CAA) and concludes that such common law claims remain viable. The
Supreme Court’s ruling in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (Ouellette),
combined with the textual, structural, and schematic similarities between the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and the CAA, form the basis for a convincing argument that the CAA does not preempt
source-state common law public nuisance claims against source-state emitters of GHG’s.
The standard for federal preemption of state common law is addressed in U.S. v. Texas,
507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (Texas). In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that when a court
interprets a federal statute, it must do so with an assumption preferring the “retention of longestablished and familiar principles,” except when it is clear that the congressional purpose of the
statute was to override the established common law principles. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534 (citing
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Assn.
v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)). When Congress legislates in an area that is typically
governed by common law, the resulting statute does not totally supersede the common law, but
only does so with regard to the specific area or issue presented in the statute. Id. Courts, when
interpreting a federal statute, can rightly assume that Congress intended to preserve common law
principles, unless it is evident that the statutory purpose was to abrogate the common law
principles. Id. (referencing Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978); City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) (Milwaukee II).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ouellette also established preemption standards for
state common law. In that case, the Court ruled that Vermont public nuisance law as applied
against New York sources of water pollution was preempted by the CWA. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at
494. However, in Ouellette, the Court did not hold that the CWA preempts all state common law
public nuisance claims—rather the Court stated that there are circumstances when the CWA does
not preempt common law nuisance claims: “The [CWA] savings clause specifically preserves
other state actions, and therefore nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a
nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State.” Id. at 497. Furthermore, the Court ruled
that holding a point source of effluent accountable to the common law of the state within which
it operates does not frustrate the purpose of the CWA: “[A]pplication of the source State’s
[nuisance] law does not disturb the balance among federal, source-state, and affected-state
interests.” Id. at 498-99.
The structure and purpose of the CAA and the CWA are extremely similar. See Id. at
487-97 (discusses the structure of the CWA); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 310-32 (discusses the

1

structure of the CWA); Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. E.P.A., 684 F.3d 102, 11319 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discusses the structure of the CAA); American Elec. Power
Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527, 2532-40 (2011) (discusses the structure of the CAA);
North Carolina, ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2010)
(discusses how the CWA and CAA are similar with regard to their respective savings clauses).
The CWA delegates authority to EPA to administer its comprehensive permitting program.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490-92. The CAA does as well. Coalition v. E.P.A., 684 F.3d 102, 11319 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The CAA explicitly preserves common law rights of action, except those
regarding motor vehicles and airplanes, and allows for states to establish more stringent
standards than the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (West
2013). The text and scheme of the CWA and CAA are so similar that the ruling in Ouellette can
be persuasively applied in interpreting the CAA. When the savings clause of the CAA is
interpreted in light of the Supreme Court’s preemption doctrine as articulated in Texas and
Ouellette, it appears clear that the CAA does not preempt source-state common law public
nuisance claims against source-state emitters of GHG’s.
However, two cases—North Carolina, ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615
F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (North Carolina v. TVA) and Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, No.
2:12 cv 929, 2012 WL 4857796 (W.D.P.A. Oct. 12, 2012) (Bell)—which appear to have been
wrongly decided, held that if an emitter is operating in compliance with the NAAQS and the
authorized state implementation plan (SIP), then it cannot be a nuisance at common law. North
Carolina v. TVA, 615 F.3d at 309; Bell, at *8. It appears that these two cases were wrongly
decided because they failed to properly follow the reasoning of Ouellette and misapplied specific
sentences from the Ouellette decision. (Bell is wrongly decided because its preemption holding
was based upon the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in North Carolina v. TVA. Bell, 2012 WL 4857796
at *9.)
In North Carolina v. TVA, the appeals court found that even if the district court had
applied source-state law as opposed to affected-state law, TVA’s operation of emitting units
within the source-state would not have constituted a public nuisance because its plants were in
compliance with source-state issued permits:
It would be odd, to say the least, for specific laws and regulations to expressly
permit a power plant to operate and then have a generic statute countermand
those permissions on public nuisance grounds. As the Supreme Court made
clear, ‘[s]tates can be expected to take into account their own nuisance laws in
setting permit requirements.’ (North Carolina v. TVA, 615 F.3d at 309 (citing
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 499))
Here, the Fourth Circuit is establishing a complete defense to public nuisance law as long as the
emitter is operating in compliance with a properly issued state permit.
In Ouellette, the Supreme Court expressly rejected that position:
An action brought against IPC under New York nuisance law would not
frustrate the goals of the CWA as would a suit governed by Vermont law…
Because the Act specifically allows source States to impose stricter standards,
the imposition of source-state law does not disrupt the regulatory partnership
established by the permit system. Second, the restriction of suits to those
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brought under source-state nuisance law prevents a source from being subject
to an indeterminate number of potential regulations. Although New York
nuisance law may impose separate standards and thus create some tension
with the permit system, a source only is required to look to a single additional
authority, whose rules should be relatively predictable. Moreover, States can
be expected to take into account their own nuisance law in setting permit
requirements. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 498-99.
Here the Court is explaining that the reason source-state nuisance law can be applied to sourcestate emitters is because doing so does not frustrate the permitting system of the CWA. In North
Carolina v. TVA, the Fourth Circuit did not hold that the ruling in Ouellette was not applicable
to the case before it because Ouellette dealt with the CWA whereas North Carolina v. TVA dealt
with the CAA. Rather in North Carolina v. TVA, the Fourth Circuit stipulated that “[w]hile
Ouellette involved a nuisance suit against a source state regulated under the [CWA], all parties
agree its holding is equally applicable to the [CAA].” North Carolina v. TVA, 615 F.3d at 306.
Ouellette explained that a source-state emitter would only have to account for one more
area of law besides the CWA—its own state’s nuisance law—and for that reason the application
of source-state nuisance law does not frustrate the permitting scheme of the CWA. The Fourth
Circuit, in North Carolina v. TVA, misconstrued the language of Ouellette to reach a
contradictory position. The Fourth Circuit held that because a source-state emitter was granted a
permit by the state, it was exempted from public nuisance claims within that state. This is based
on the assumption that the state, in issuing the permit, contemplated its own nuisance law prior to
the issuance of the permit. The Fourth Circuit justified this position using the language of
Ouellette, yet Ouellette expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion. Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in North Carolina v. TVA is not persuasive. Based on a fair reading of
Ouellette, a source-state emitter should be subject to source-state common law public nuisance
causes of action, even if it has a properly issued state permit.
In North Carolina v. TVA, the Fourth Circuit asserted that North Carolina was making a
veiled attempt to apply North Carolina common law to emitting units in Alabama. North
Carolina v. TVA, 615 F.3d at 309. If this were the case, the Court’s ruling in Ouellette would
bar North Carolina’s claim. However, this was not the case. The district court decision, which
North Carolina v. TVA overturned, made no mention of applying North Carolina law to the TVA
emitting units in Alabama—rather it discussed applying Alabama common law to Alabama
emitters. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 593 F.Supp.2d 812, 82930 (W.D.N.C. 2009). The Fourth Circuit dismissed the analysis of the district court without
addressing it on its stated terms. For this reason also, the ruling in North Carolina v. TVA, is not
persuasive.
Moreover, North Carolina v. TVA is unpersuasive because its preemption analysis of
state common law nuisance claims did not follow the reasoning established by the Supreme
Court in Texas. There is a long-established and familiar common law principle that allows for
activities that otherwise comply with all applicable regulations to be considered a public
nuisance, if those activities cause significant harm that is unreasonable under the circumstances.
Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-34 (Exch. Ch. 1862). As mentioned earlier, one of
the source-states involved in the North Carolina v. TVA case was Alabama. According to

3

Alabama law, a nuisance is “anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage to another. The
fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful does not keep it from being a nuisance.” Tipler v.
McKenzie Tank Lines, 547 So.2d 438, 440 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Ala. Code § 6-5-120). This
means that, in order for the CAA to preempt the source-state common law, it has to specifically
address this well-established principle of Alabama law.
The CAA specifically preserves common law causes of action, which necessarily include
public nuisance claims, except when they are being used to regulate motor vehicles and
airplanes—moving sources. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (West 2013). Accordingly, the CAA only
supersedes the common law with regard to the specific area or issue presented in the statute—
moving sources. Id. The source-state emitting units in North Carolina v. TVA were stationary
sources, not moving sources. Courts, when interpreting a federal statute, should assume that
Congress intended to preserve the common law principle, unless it is evident that the statutory
purpose was to abrogate the common law principle. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534 (referencing Mobil
Oil, 436 U.S. at 625; Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315). Since Congress only explicitly preempted
state and common law with regard to the regulation of moving sources, it is clear that the
statutory intent was to preserve common law causes of action against source-state stationary
sources. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(e) (West 2013); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (West 2013); Ouellette, 479
U.S. at 498-99 (analyzing the savings clause of the CWA, which is extremely similar to the
savings clause of the CAA). Therefore, the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina v. TVA should
have construed the CAA with the assumption that the long-standing and familiar principle—
namely that even activities that are in compliance with the law can constitute a public nuisance in
certain circumstances where the activities cause foreseeable, significant harm that is
unreasonable—remained intact, except with regard to moving sources. The Fourth Circuit’s
preemption analysis is therefore flawed and unpersuasive.
A fair reading of Ouellette leads to the conclusion that the CAA does not preempt the
source-state common law of public nuisance. The Fourth Circuit’s decision in North Carolina v.
TVA is unpersuasive due to its misinterpretation of common law preemption, the Ouellette
decision, and the CAA. The text and scheme of the CAA and CWA are so similar, that the
reasoning in Ouellette can fairly be applied to the CAA. Ouellette holds that source-state
common law nuisance actions against source-state dischargers of effluent do not frustrate the
purpose of, nor are they preempted by, the CWA. For the same reasons, the CAA does not
preempt source-state common law public nuisance claims against source-state emitters of GHGs.
Because the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in North Carolina v. TVA was misguided, large-scale
emitters of GHGs should not feel protected by its ruling, since the decision has questionable
precedential value.

Thomas Alves is entering his third year at Hofstra Law School. During the summers of 2012 and
2013, he worked as a legal intern at the firm Blish & Cavanagh, LLP in Providence, R.I.
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